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Killing the goose? The value chain
for sorghum beer in Kenya
Alastair Orr
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, Nairobi, Kenya
Abstract
Purpose – The decision by the Government of Kenya in 2013 to increase tax revenue by imposing excise duty
of 50 percent on sorghum beer resulted in economic losses for smallholders, the brewery, and the government
itself because it effectively killed the value chain. In 2015, the government reversed the policy decision and
reduced excise duty to 10 percent. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of this policy decision on
the value chain, adaptation by growers and the brewery, and the rationale for this policy change and its reversal.
Design/methodology/approach – The author analyzes this episode using a conceptual framework derived
from complex adaptive systems, focusing on four properties of such systems: sudden, endogenous shocks,
interacting agents, and adaptation.
Findings – The author shows how the nature of politics in Kenya exposed the value chain to endogenous
shocks as the result of conflicts between interacting agents, where smallholder farmer organizations were
important for successful adaptation. Conflicts between development and political objectives in neo-patrimonial
states are sources of complexity and uncertainty in smallholder value chains.
Research limitations/implications – Complex adaptive systems proved a useful framework to
understand decision making by government and business actors in the value chain.
Originality/value – The paper applies a novel conceptual framework to the analysis of an important value
chain in Kenya.
Keywords Agriculture, Kenya, Value chain
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
A cottager and his wife had a goose that laid a golden egg every day. They supposed that the goose
must contain a great lump of gold inside, and in order to get the gold they killed her. Having done
so, they found to their surprise that the goose differed in no respect from their other geese.
The foolish pair, thus hoping to become rich all at once, deprived themselves of the gain of which
they were assured day by day (TRADITIONAL FABLE).
Smallholder value chains sometimes behave in unpredictable ways. There are some obvious
reasons for this. On the supply side, production may be interrupted by climatic events that
lead to a poor harvest that leaves smallholders with little to sell, or forces them to prioritize
home consumption. On the demand side, competition may push up prices and reduce
demand from some end-users, which in turn may reduce the supply of specific products.
Sudden changes in government policy may affect both supply and demand by creating
incentives for growers to increase production, or by imposing periodic trade bans that
reduce access to regional or global markets. In combination, these factors create an
uncertain environment for smallholder value chain development.
The story of sorghum beer in Kenya illustrates the importance of government policy for
the development of smallholder value chains. The successful development of this value chain
was possible only because of a tax break that made sorghum beer competitive in price with
illegal brews. However, this left the future growth of the value chain vulnerable to changes in
policy. The sudden removal of this tax break in 2013 brought the growth of the value chain to
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a shuddering halt, and resulted in lower profits for the brewing industry and loss of income for
smallholders. Ironically, the increase in government revenue from the excise duty was far
below expectations, making the change in policy counter-productive. The episode brings to
mind the old fable of “killing the goose that laid the golden eggs.”
In the language of complex systems, the value chain for sorghum beer was sensitive to
initial conditions. This sensitivity reflects the close connection between business and politics
in Kenya. In the case of sorghum beer, this had two aspects. First, sorghum beer was as
much a political as a commercial creation, because without government’s agreement to
waive excise duty it was not commercially viable. From the government side, sorghum beer
was seen as an instrument of social control, extending its reach over the extensive trade in
illicit brews that accounted for 40 percent of the market for alcohol, and a step toward
imposing order over an area outside state control. Second, politics in Kenya is dominated by
ethnic rivalries. The concentration of crops and livestock in specific regions means that
“there is a strong association between a particular [ethnic] group and most of the main
agricultural value chains in the country” (Poulton and Kanyinga, 2014). Sorghum’s
concentration in Eastern Kenya made the value chain vulnerable to these rivalries when the
region ended up on the losing side. Defeat in the election of 2013 left Eastern Kenya
dangerously exposed. The decision by the new government to impose excise duty on
sorghum beer was as much a tax on political opponents as a device for boosting government
revenues. Thus, the close connection between government and business could work to the
disadvantage as well as to the advantage of the value chain. Government policy can both
make and break smallholder value chains.
The episode raises a number of research questions:
RQ1. What effect did the imposition of excise duty have on the value chain?
RQ2. Why did government initially agree to a zero excise duty and then suddenly
change its mind?
RQ3. How did the value chain actors adapt to this policy change and why, after just two
years, did government execute a U-turn and reverse its decision to impose excise
duty on sorghum beer?
The development of clear sorghum beer and the impact of the policy change are well
documented. This study synthesizes information both from primary sources (national
statistics on beer consumption, the national press, and company reports) and from
secondary literature, including business case studies based on personal interviews with
brewery executives, policy studies and briefs, and studies of alcohol consumption in Kenya.
One limitation is the absence of primary data from interviews with the civil servants and
policy makers responsible for this change in policy. Since we did not have access to these
individuals, our analysis of the rationale for this decision is based on circumstantial
evidence, including their justification to Parliament and the nature of policy making in
Kenya. Given its politically sensitive nature, the reasons for this policy decision and its
sudden reversal may never be fully known.
The general objective of this paper is to answer these questions using a conceptual
framework based on complex adaptive systems (Orr et al., 2018). Specifically, we apply four
of the common properties of this framework. First, we use the properties of sudden and
endogenous shocks to illustrate the impact of this policy change on the value chain. Second,
we use the property of interacting agents to understand the behavior of different value chain
actors. Third, we use the property of adaptation to deepen our understanding of how
different actors responded to this policy change. To the extent that other value chains are
also vulnerable to sudden changes in government policy, the findings have wider relevance
for understanding the development of smallholder value chains.
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The paper is divided into six sections. Following this introduction, Section 2 describes
the value chain and the policy shock. Sections 3 and 4 analyze the interactions between
agents that led to the policy decision, and how these agents adapted. Wider issues raised by
this episode are discussed in Section 5. The final section concludes.
2. Sudden and endogenous shocks
In economic models, changes in tax policy are treated as an exogenous shock. However, this
restricts the analysis to explaining the effects of economic policy rather than its causes.
It treats government as a deus ex machina outside the system. However, if we view the
economy as a complex adaptive system of which government is a part, then we cannot avoid
the question of why certain policy decisions are made. From the perspective of complex
adaptive systems, therefore policy is endogenous because it is created by interacting agents
within the system. Thus, the decision to hike the excise duty on sorghum beer policy was
not something like rainfall, over which agents had no control, but was the result of a process
of negotiation between different actors in the value chain. Hence, we should not see shocks
as something external to the value chain, but also as generated from within the value chain,
by uncertainty, by technological change, and also by “interacting agents” whose individual
behavior can have unpredictable results for the system as a whole (Orr et al., 2018). Again,
complex systems are characterized by sudden changes, caused by feedback loops, where the
system lurches suddenly to a new equilibrium (Orr et al., 2018). The value chain for sorghum
beer in Kenya illustrates the role of these two common properties of complex adaptive
systems. In this section, we set this sudden, endogenous shock in historical perspective,
placing it within the wider context of the growth of the brewing industry, its contribution to
government revenue, and the government’s fiscal policy.
A wide variety of alcoholic drinks are available in Kenya. Table I describes the drinks
mentioned in this paper, distinguishing between “commercial” beers and “home-brews.” In
Kenya, “home-brew” spirits (chang’aa) have always been illegal while traditional “home-
brew” beers (busaa) were declared illegal by President Moi in 1979 (Willis, 2002)[1], although
they were still widely consumed, often with the connivance of the police (Bodewes, 2010;
Roberts, 2000; de Smedt, 2009). The Liquor Act of 2007 legalized busaa but not chang’aa
(Mutisya and Willis, 2009).
Although traditional opaque beers have a long history in Kenya, the commercial
production of clear lager beer began in 1922, with the establishment of Kenya Breweries
Limited (KBL) (Willis, 2002). By independence in 1963, KBL was part of East African
Breweries Limited (EABL) with subsidiaries in Tanzania (Tanzania Breweries Limited) and a
major share in Uganda Breweries (Rodwell, 1982). With consolidated profits of GBP1.5 million
and assets of GBP1.6 million, KBL was Kenya’s largest local company (Rodwell, 1982). When
in 1947 Kenya revoked the legal ban on Africans drinking bottled beer, the stage was set for
the take-off of the formal brewing sector. By 2011, EABL was the second biggest company in
Eastern Africa valued at $1,599 million (African Business, 2012). Not surprisingly, the history
of EABL is seen as “an unmitigated success story” (Partanen, 1991).
Figure 1 shows beer production in the formal sector between 1960 and 2015. This represents
total beer production – there is no separate series for clear sorghum beer, which was not
introduced in Kenya until 2006[2]. By 2009, Senator keg had overtaken Tusker as Kenya’s
biggest-selling beer by volume (Ogola andMungai, 2011b). According to Euromonitor, by 2011
Senator keg was the second-most popular beer in Kenya, commanding 15.3 percent of the beer
market by volume, and had earned EABL $380 million in net sales[3].
Over the period 1960-2015, the production of beer in Kenya rose from 23,000 to 4.7 million
liters. Except for a dip in 1980, the period 1960-1992 was a period of uninterrupted
growth. During the 1970s, KBL worked at full capacity and struggled to meet demand
(Rodwell, 1982). However, the ten years 1992-2002 saw a sharp and prolonged fall in
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production from 3.7 to 1.9 million liters per year. This represented a drop of 48 percent.
By comparison, in the period 2012-2014 production fell sharply from 5.6 to 3.4 million liters,
representing a drop of 27 percent. Thus, the crisis over sorghum beer was not the first time
that beer production in Kenya had experienced a sudden shock. Moreover, the drop in 2013
Name
Legal status
in Kenya Starch source
Amylolytic
agent Fermentation
Alcohol content
(% v/v)
Commercial
Clear Lager Beer
(Tusker)
Legal Barley Barley malt Brewers’
yeast
4.2
Clear Lager Beer
(Senator Keg)
Legal Sorghum and barley Barley malt Brewers’
yeast
6
Opaque sorghum
beer (chibuku)
Legal Sorghum Sorghum
malt
Brewers’
yeast
2-4
“New generation” or
“power” drinks
Unclear Millet, maize, banana,
pineapple juice, etc.
Na. Yeast 10-25
Home-brews
Opaque beer Illegal until
2007
Sorghum Sorghum
malt
Wild yeasts 2-4
Opaque beer (busaa) Illegal until
2007
Maize, maize flour Finger
millet malt
Wild yeasts 2-4
Spirits (chang’aa) Illegal Maize beer residues,
jaggery
Na. Bakers’ yeast 25-60
Notes: Home-brewed opaque beer made from sorghum was never common in Kenya. In semi-arid eastern
Kenya, where sorghum is still widely grown, opaque beer was usually made from honey or sugarcane
(Lindblom, 1920/1969, pp. 518-519), or millet if these were not available (Dundas, 1913, p. 503). Cheap imports
and mechanical cane-crushers increased the use of sugar for brewing beer (Ambler, 1991, pp. 168-169). Nout’s
(1981) review of traditional beers in Kenya does not mention beer made from sorghum
Sources: Opaque beer (busaa), opaque sorghum beer (chibuku) and home-brew spirits (chang’aa)
(Nout, 1981); Opaque beer (pombe) (Bryceson, 2002); “New generation” or “power” drinks (Willis, 2003); for
legal status see Willis (2003)
Table I.
Alcoholic beverages
mentioned in the text
y=6,902.1x+3,5961
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
00
0 
litr
es
Production Linear (Production)
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (1960-2016)
Figure 1.
Beer production in
Kenya, 1960-2015
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was neither as severe nor as prolonged as that in 1992. As we shall see in Section 3, both
these sudden drops in production were the direct result of government policy.
Beer consumption in Kenya shows a similar picture (Figure 2). Consumption per head
rose strongly after 1960, reaching 28 litres/adult/year in 1980. Average consumption then
remained steady for the next decade before plunging in 1992, reaching a low point of
11 liters in 2002, before recovering to reach 19 litres/adult/year in 2012. Consumption fell
sharply again between 2013 and 2014 to 12 litres/adult/year, before recovering to 17 litres/
adult/year in 2015. Since the 1990s, average consumption has remained at less than half the
level reached in the 1970s and 1980s. The only available price series for beer is for Tusker,
EABL’s flagship brand. To compute the real price of beer, we deflated the retail price of
Tusker by the retail price of maize grain. The results show that rising beer consumption in
the period 1960-1980 was aided by falling real prices for beer, from 4.4 kg maize/bottle in
1970 to just 1.1 kg maize/bottle in 1981. At this period in Kenya’s history, the price of beer
was directly controlled by government, and these controls were lifted only in the 1980s.
Since the early 1990s, there was a steady rise in the real price of bottled beer, which reached
between 3 and 3.5 kg maize/bottle in the last decade. The result was to exclude many
potential customers from the formal sector, forcing them to rely for alcohol on the informal
sector, including illicit brews (chang’aa) with their high-health risks.
As elsewhere, alcohol in Kenya is a lucrative source of government revenue. Figure 3
shows the share of excise duty on beer to total tax revenue. The results are the reverse
image of beer production. While the period 1960-1992 saw a steady rise in beer production
and consumption (Figures 1 and 2), the same period saw a fall in the share of tax revenue
from excise duty on the sale of beer, which dropped from 6 to 7 percent in the early 1970s to
just 1 percent in 1990. Conversely, the steep fall in beer production and consumption after
1992 and the rise in the real price of beer from the 1990s were mirrored by a rise in the share
of excise duty on beer as a share of total tax revenue. This climbed sharply to reach its
previous level of 7 percent. Subsequently, however, the share of excise duty on beer started
a slow decline until by 2015 it had reached just 2 percent to tax revenue, close to the lowest
level reached in the early 1990s.
The sudden drop in beer production in 2013 was caused by the government’s decision to
hike the excise duty for sorghum beer. In September 2013, a new tax regime came into force
through the Customs and Excise Act that introduced excise duty on beer made from
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Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (1960-2016)
Figure 2.
Beer consumption per
head and real price of
beer, 1960-2015
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sorghum, millet, or cassava at 50 percent of the rate charged on other beverages on top of
the 16 percent VAT that beer already attracts. The new tax measure added 35 KES/liter to
the cost of producing sorghum beer. EABL passed most of this increase on to 1 he consumer.
As a result, the price of 300 ml glass increased from KES20 to between KES45 and KES50.
Unfortunately, we do not know the price elasticity of demand for clear sorghum beer.
However, we know that the consumption of Tusker beer is price elastic with an own-price
elasticity of demand of –1.1 in the short run and 2.12 in the long run (Karingi et al., 2001).
Thus, a 10 percent increase in the price of Tusker reduces demand for lager by 10 percent in
the short run and 22 percent in the long run. If we assume the same unitary short-run price
elasticity of demand for clear sorghum beer as for Tusker, then increasing the price Ks20
per 300 ml glass to Ks45 would have reduced sales significantly. According to the brewing
industry, sales volume fell by over 75 percent (EABL, 2014). A price increase of 50 percent
that resulted in a 75 percent drop in sales implies a short-run price elasticity of −1.25.
Falling sales forced EABL to reduce production at its main Nairobi plant in Ruaraka from
seven to five days a week[4]. The plunge in sales made the tax self-defeating.
The government expected to generate an extra KES6.2 billion each year. However, analysis
of tax remission by EABL to the government before and after the imposition of excise duty
shows a 5 percent decline in tax remission and a 62 percent loss to the anticipated tax
income with excise duty (Opiyo, 2014a). By contrast, when the government reduced
the excise duty from 50 to 10 percent, the demand for sorghum by EABL trebled and tax
revenues from clear sorghum beer increased by 30 percent (EABL, 2015).
The impact of this policy change was felt right along the value chain. Between 2009 and
2012, EABL had increased the utilization of sorghum from 474 to 12,715 tons (with the
greatest increase reported between 2011 and 2012). In 2014, however, EABL purchased just
4,500 tons. Intermediaries – the companies and small traders that collected and transported
sorghum to EABL – found that business had dried up. Sorghum growers – mostly
smallholders in semi-arid Kenya who relied on sorghum for cash income – were left without
a cash crop. The exact number of farmers affected is unknown. According to EABL, the
number of smallholders supplying the brewery reached 60,000 by 2013 (East African
Breweries Limited (EABL), 2013). The average quantity of sorghum marketed by
smallholders in Kitui county in 2012-2013 was 305 kg/household (Orr et al., 2014). Using this
figure and a total utilization of 12,715 in 2012 gives the number of smallholders supplying
sorghum to EABL as 41,668. However, EABL sourced sorghum from Sudan and Tanzania
as well as Kenya. Hence, the number of small farmers affected in Kenya was somewhere
0
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Figure 3.
Beer excise as share
of total tax revenue,
1960-2015
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between 20 and 30,000. One estimate put the total cost of the damage caused by the excise
duty at KES6,396,463, of which 4,138,130 (65 percent) was incurred by EABL, 2,000,000
(31 percent) by the government in lost tax revenue, 180,050 (3 percent) by sorghum growers,
and 78,283 (1 percent) by intermediaries (Opiyo, 2014a). The basis for these figures is not
given. Whatever the real figure, the damage was certainly substantial. On the other hand,
these estimates do not take account of the benefits from the hike in excise duty that might
have resulted for other sectors of the economy, notably the manufacturers and retailers of
home-brewed beer and spirits (chiefly women) and their suppliers.
3. Interacting agents
Complex adaptive systems are characterized by interacting agents, where the behavior of
individual agents is not fixed but depends on the behavior of other agents. Small differences
between agents can therefore have a large effect on the overall system, and interaction
between agents can produce unpredictable results. Thus, interacting agents generate
uncertainty from within the system (Orr et al., 2018). In this section, we analyze the
interactions between the key actors in the value chain for sorghum beer. In particular, we
focus on interactions between government and EABL and the breakdown in this
relationship which led to the imposition of excise duty on sorghum beer.
Kenya is a prime example of a “neo-patrimonial” state, in which political patrons use
state resources to buy loyalty from clients. Business and politics in Kenya are closely
intertwined (Hornsby, 2013). Successful businessmen become politicians, and successful
politicians use their power to become businessmen. Political vendettas are carried over into
the world of business, with economic weapons used to settle political scores. In these
systems, political parties are not based on ideology, but are factions that combine simply to
win elections. Consequently, a “policy change” is not part of a wider ideological agenda but
is designed to keep the ruling party in power, by buying friends or punishing enemies.
The relationship between EABL and government has been mixed (Table II). Until the
1990s, the relationship was harmonious. After independence, the twin objectives of the
government’s industrial policy were import substitution (replacing imports with products
made in Kenya) and Africanization (jobs for black Kenyans). This suited EABL. Kenya
Breweries has always marketed itself as a “national company,” wrapping itself in the
1992 General and presidential elections, December
1993 Government increases combined taxes on beer to 153% per unit
1993-2003 Beer consumption in Kenya falls from 14 to 8 liters per capita
1997 EABL launches “Citizen” Lager, a non-malted, bottled barley beer
1998 SABMiller enters Kenyan beer market with subsidiary Castle Brewing, Thika
2002 SABMiller exits Kenyan beer market
2003 EABL launches “Senator” a non-malted barley beer, for $0.33 per 300 ml bottle
2004 Government reduces excise tax for non-malted keg beer to 30%
2004 EABL re-launches “Senator” as “Senator Keg” for $0.27 per 300 ml glass
2006 Government reduces excise tax for non-malted keg beer by 100%
2007 General and presidential elections, December
2008 Production of “Senator Keg” overtakes production of “Tusker”
2009 EABL buys a majority stake in Serengeti Breweries, Tanzania
2010 Production of “Senator Keg” reaches 2 million hectoliters
2013 General and presidential elections, March
2013 Government introduces 50% excise duty on non-malted keg beer, October
2013 Alcoholic Drinks Control (Amendment) Bill 2010 (the “Mutotho law”) restricts drinking hours
and legalizes licensed production of bottled chang’aa
2013 Demand for Senator Keg drops by 75%
2015 Government reduces excise duty on sorghum beer from 50% to 10%, May
Table II.
Timeline for sorghum
beer in Kenya,
1993-2015
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Kenyan flag to win the loyalty of domestic consumers and to enlist state support in fighting
off foreign competition. This is illustrated by the “Beer War” between EABL and SABMiller,
South Africa’s biggest beer company. After independence in 1963, EABL swiftly bought out
smaller breweries and enjoyed a virtual monopoly until 1998, when SABMiller bought
Castle Brewing in Thika. Competition between EABL and SABMiller for Kenya’s shrinking
beer market saw EABL invoked patriotism by marketing its Tusker brand under the slogan
“My Country, My Beer”[5]. The “Beer War” ended with a truce in 2002 when SABMiller sold
Castle Brewing to EABL, which promptly closed it down. In return, EABL closed Kibo
Breweries in Moshi, Tanzania, with SABMiller agreeing to distribute EABL beers in
Tanzania and EABL agreeing to distribute SABMiller beers in Kenya. Victory for EABL in
the Beer Wars was also a victory for import substitution and left EABL with a monopoly in
the beer market in Kenya. Similarly, the Africanization of top management was an early
priority for EABL, with the first African Kenyan directors appointed in 1959, and the first
African Kenyan chairman in 1978 (Rodwell, 1982). Even before independence, most
distribution was in the hands of Africans and “beer propelled the success of a new
generation of African entrepreneurs” (Willis, 2002). Some, like the distributor Njenga
Karume, became powerful politicians (Swainson, 1980). By 1977, nine in ten EABL
shareholders were East African residents (Rodwell, 1982).
This relationship soured in the 1990s. EABL openly supported the transition to multi-
party rule in 1992 (Willis, 2003). Kenneth Matiba, the first African Chairman of EABL (1978-
1984) and himself an MP, and Charles Rubia, an EABL Director and the Mayor of Nairobi,
led the campaign to topple President Daniel arap Moi (Hornsby, 2013). When Moi was
unexpectedly re-elected President in 1992, EABL paid a heavy price. To help pay for
Moi’s re-election, the new government hiked the excise duty on bottled beer. Between 1993
and 1994, beer prices doubled in real terms (Figure 2). The share of beer in total excise
revenue rose sharply, from just 16 percent in 1989 to 59 percent in 1994, and has remained at
between 50 and 60 percent of total excise revenue to this day (Figure 3). Thus, the close
connection between business and the state was a two-edged sword. Backing the wrong
horse had serious consequences for EABL. Twenty years before a similar episode with
sorghum beer, this experience demonstrated the effect that a sudden hike in excise duty
could have on the demand for beer and on the brewing industry.
The close relationship between government and business was also evident in the
decision by EABL to develop clear sorghum beer. From a government perspective,
this was attractive for two reasons. First, it promised potential health benefits. Real
income per head fell throughout the 1990s and did not recover until 2003. In 2006, real
income averaged KES34,000 per head, the same level as in 1990 (Mwega and Ndung’u,
2008). This “lost decade” encouraged consumers to search for cheaper sources of alcohol
(Willis, 2003), particularly illicit brews (Bryceson, 2002). In 1978, chang’aa accounted for
one-third of all alcohol consumed in Kenya – twice as much as bottled beer and formal
sector spirits combined (Partanen, 1991). Poisoning from chang’aa and “power drinks”
captured the headlines[6]. The government was blamed for taxing beer beyond the reach
of poorer consumers. This was not a challenge that the government could ignore.
The legitimacy of the post-colonial state rested on its claim to be in control of development
and the well-being of its citizens (Willis, 2002). The Ministry of Health supported EABL’s
campaign for tax breaks on non-malted beers, on public health grounds (Ogola and
Mungai, 2011b). The second attraction for government was that it encouraged local
production of sorghum. This was not without a political dimension. Eastern Kenya – the
center of sorghum production – is home to the Akamba tribe, which had voted
overwhelmingly for President Kibaki and his party in the presidential elections in 2002
(Hornsby, 2013). Stimulating the market for sorghum was a way of rewarding the Akamba
for their political support.
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For EABL, sorghum beer made good commercial sense. First, EABL faced stiff
competition from “new generation” or “power drinks (Willis, 2003). These emerged as a
direct response to higher prices for bottled beer. Although packaged as “modern” drinks,
they were classed as “traditional,” and attracted an excise tax of just 10 percent. In terms of
alcohol content, “power drinks” were four to five times cheaper than EABL’s “Citizen” lager
and successfully competed for the lower end of the market. Although EABL successfully
lobbied for a government ban on “power drinks” in 1998, this proved impossible to
enforce[7]. At the same time, the government lifted the ban on the manufacture of palm wine,
a favorite on the coast (Mutisya and Willis, 2009). Clearly, the lack of a consistent or
effective policy toward illegal alcohol meant that EABL had to compete on price. Second, the
devaluation of the Kenya shilling in the 1990s raised the cost of imported malt, while
the price of barley also rose sharply in the 1990s relative to the price of sorghum
(Orr et al., 2014). Although Kenya produces barley, price fluctuations encouraged EABL to
search for cheaper alternatives. According to EABL, replacing barley with a sorghum
adjunct cut production costs by 20-30 percent[8]. Finally, in-house expertise was available
through Guinness International Limited, which had bought 48 percent of EABL during the
“Beer Wars” when EABL issued shares needed to raise capital (Willis, 2002). In 1997
Guinness merged with Diageo, which started the production of clear sorghum beer in Ghana
in the early 2000s (van Wijk and Kwakkenbos, 2011)[9]. In combination, these factors made
clear sorghum beer an irresistible commercial opportunity for EABL.
Clear sorghum beer was designed for a specific segment of the consumer market.
The new beer was targeted at “aspirational” consumers wanting to “trade up” from
home-brewed drinks who could not afford bottled beers made from more expensive malted
barley. The decisive factor in this market was price. Kenya’s first locally produced clear
sorghum beer – Senator – was released in 2003[10]. Disappointing sales of Senator led to the
decision to sell clear sorghum beer in kegs, rather than bottles, in order to reduce packaging
costs[11]. Senator keg, launched in 2004, combined two “modalities” of alcohol usage
(Bryceson, 2002), blending the sociability of the traditional, communal pot with the
middle-class image of a clear, hygienic beer consumed in a modern setting. Senator keg bars,
with their colorful branding, were like a sanitized shebeen. Despite this packaging, however,
the price of Senator keg was still above the KES20 price point that would allow it to compete
with local brews. To make Senator keg competitive, EABL had to persuade government to
waive the excise duty on sorghum beer (EABL, 2013). The decisive factor in Senator keg’s
success was the tax break granted to non-malted beers. Market research by EABL revealed
that 56 percent of alcohol consumption consisted of traditional fermented brews (busaa) or
distilled spirits (chang’aa), which were illegal and therefore untaxed. Eliminating excise
duty would encourage consumers to switch to Senator keg, boost sales of legal beer, and
allow government to collect some of the VAT and corporation tax lost from the sale of illicit
brews. In 2004, the government granted a remission of 30 percent on excise duty, increased
to 100 percent in 2006. This allowed Senator keg to be sold at KES20 (USD0.26) per 300 ml
glass, the same price as most illegal brews (Ogola and Mungai, 2011b).
The tax break on Senator keg lasted until 2013, when the government re-imposed an
excise duty of 50 percent. Beer made fully from sorghum, millet, and cassava continued to
enjoy full remission in excise duty, however[12].
The government gave two reasons for the imposition of excise duty on sorghum beer
(Business Daily, May 31 2013). First, the original objective of discouraging illegal brews was
not being met. Second, consumers of bottled beer were switching to Senator keg. This posed a
threat to revenue collection, since bottled beer carried a high excise duty[13]. The government
had used the same argument to resist the call for tax exemption on Senator keg (Kanter and
Bird, 2009). How justified were these claims? Senator keg may indeed have reduced demand
for chang’aa, but there was no proof of this, since neither EABL nor the Ministry of Health had
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commissioned research to validate this claim[14]. The second argument is impossible to prove
without comparing sales figures for different brands, which are a closely guarded secret.
However, EABL was aware of this possibility. Senator, EABL’s first attempt at sorghum beer,
had reduced sales of other brands of bottled beer (Kanter and Bird, 2009). To avoid this,
Senator keg was sold in specially branded outlets where retailers were forbidden to sell other
EABL beers (EABL, 2013; Mutisya and Willis, 2009). On the other hand, EABL was planning
to launch Senator Dark Extra (September, 2013) and Senator Stout (May 2014). As clear
sorghum beer they were exempt from excise duty, but these were bottled beers targeted at
higher-income consumers. This was not part of the original deal, where EABL had pledged to
use a separate route to market for Senator keg in order that government would not lose
revenue from excise duty on bottled beers (Kanter and Bird, 2009).
Besides these reasons given by the government, there were two other compelling reasons
for the imposition of excise duty. One was the rising level of government expenditure. Just as
President Moi’s decision to raise excise duty on beer followed an election in December 1992, so
President Kenyatta’s decision to impose excise duty on sorghum beer followed elections in
March 2013. The election brought a rise in the ratio of national debt to GDP (36 percent in
2012/2013) and the ratio of the fiscal deficit to government revenue (−37 percent in 2012/13)
(Figure 4). This was attributed to the cost of the election itself and promises made during the
election campaign, included decentralized county governments and higher salaries (World
Bank, 2014). This made it imperative to raise government tax revenue. Excise duty on
sorghum beer was expected to generate an additional KES6.2 billion in tax revenue.
Why did government target EABL? One reason may be the growing gap between
company sales and income tax payments. Figure 5 shows key financial indicators for
EABL between 2005 and 2016. Following the launch of Senator keg in 2004, EABL’s net
sales rose from KES19 million in 2005 (the year before full remission of excise duty) to
59 million in 2013. In the same period, income tax payments by EABL rose from KES2
million to KES4 million. However, the ratio of income tax payments to net sales fell from
13 percent in 2005 to just 7 percent in 2013. Thus, on top of the bonanza in sales revenue
thanks to duty-free sorghum beer, EABL was also paying relatively less income tax.
This may have raised suspicions (justified or not) that EABL was paying less than its fair
share. Although the Government of President Uhuru Kenyatta was pro-business, the
businessmen who had Kenyatta’s ear were from the newer industries like telecoms, rather
than from established industries like brewing (Booth et al., 2014). And the new President
was under no financial obligation to EABL. Kenyatta’s family was so wealthy that it could
pay its own election expenses without depending on financial support from business
interests and others (Booth et al., 2014).
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Finally, we cannot discount political factors. The centers of sorghum production in Kenya
are the Eastern region (home to the Akamba tribe) and Western region (home to the Luo).
These were the power bases of Raila Odinga, the opposition presidential candidate, and of
Odinga’s running-mate Kalonzo Musyoka. In the 2013 election that brought President
Uhuru Kenyatta to power, Eastern and Western Kenya voted solidly for the opposition.
Just as with EABL in 1992, sorghum growers in Kenya had backed the losing side and could
not expect any favors from those in power.
Adaptation
Complex systems are “adaptive” because they evolve and learn. Adaptation is defined as
“change in behavior to ensure survival or success” (Mitchell, 2009). In this section, we
compare the adaptive strategies used by the different actors in the value chain. Ultimately,
these strategies succeeded in making government reverse its decision to impose a 50 percent
excise duty on sorghum beer.
The strategies followed by EABL illustrate how large companies successfully adapt to
shocks. One strategy was innovation. Following the decline in sales of Senator keg as the
result of higher prices, EABL simply replaced Senator keg with a new product, a cheap
spirit called Jebel Gold[15]. Already in the innovation pipeline, the launch of Jebel Gold was
accelerated following the imposition of excise duty on Senator keg (EABL, 2014). Packaged
in a 30-liter keg dispenser, and competitively priced at KES10-15 per 30 ml tot, Jebel Gold
was a remodel of the bottled Jebel Special brand, which EABL had introduced in 2012 at
KES100 for a 200 ml bottle (EABL, 2013). Just like Senator keg, Jebel Gold was targeted at
the consumer segment of “aspirational” drinkers trading up from chang’aa. Sales of Jebel
Gold grew by 32 percent in 2014 (EABL, 2015).
A second adaptive strategy was to cut dividends, from KES8.75/share in 2012 to
KES5.50/share in 2013 and 2014 (EABL, 2013, 2014). This was a significant cut of
37 percent. Thus, shareholders suffered. However, the impact on the profits of EABL was
far less severe. Profits before tax fell by just 6 percent between 2012 and 2013 (Figure 4). As
a diversified company with multiple brands and subsidiaries in Uganda, Tanzania, and
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south Sudan, EABL was well insulated from sudden shocks to a specific brand in one
location. As the Group Chairman reported, “The impact of the duty rise in Senator keg was
cushioned by the stronger sales growth in premium and mainstream beer as well as spirits”
(EABL, 2014). Profits before tax fell a further 6 percent in 2014, but the dividend was pegged
at the same level of KES5.50/share. This was still more than shareholders received before
the success of Senator keg. Overall, therefore, EABL was able to weather the storm without
great difficulty. And after the decision to impose excise duty on sorghum beer was reversed,
shareholders were rewarded with a record dividend of KES12/share in 2016.
Smallholders were a weaker position. As demand from EABL dried up, they had no
choice but to cut production. Growers first heard the news about the imposition of excise
duty in the budget speech of June 5, 2013, well before the main planting season for sorghum
in the short rains (October-December). However, they ignored the implications. The area
planted to sorghum in Kitui county – the biggest producer – actually rose from 58,000 ha in
2012 to 76,000 ha in 2013 before falling back to 59,000 ha in 2014 (Ministry of Agriculture,
Livestock and Fisheries, 2016). Alternative markets for sorghum in Kenya are limited.
The livestock-feed industry relies on maize, which is cheaper. Flour processors require
sorghum but not as much as the 12,000 t bought by EABL in 2012. Finally, smallholders in
the semi-arid regions where sorghum is grown had few alternative cash crops.
Opposition to the excise duty was led by a national farmers’ organization, the Cereal
Growers Association (CGA). Besides its representative role, the CGA was implementing two
donor-funded projects to increase sorghum production among 35,000 growers in semi-arid
regions (Opiyo, 2014a). They formed a coalition to lobby for the remission of excise duty.
Members of this coalition included the East African Grain Council (a regional trade
association, which included grain processors) and an international NGO, the Alliance for a
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)[16]. The CGA had the resources to commission a review
by a respected think-tank, the Tegemeo Institute, which provided evidence on the income
lost by farmers as well as the meager benefits for government revenue (Opiyo, 2014a).
EABL does not seem to have been involved in this coalition directly, preferring to operate
behind the scenes[17]. This coalition of farmers, processors, and NGO formed a powerful
advocacy group which was hard for government to ignore.
By contrast, the government’s case was not strong. First, there was hard evidence that
the excise duty had not delivered the expected increase in tax revenue. Second, the negative
impact on sorghum growers contradicted other policy objectives, including the agricultural
policy to raise production in semi-arid regions (Mailu and Mulinge, 2016) and the
Millennium Goal of poverty reduction. Finally, the tax was regressive, penalizing low-
income consumers and potentially increasing the risks to public health from the
consumption of chang’aa. In combination, these made the imposition of the excise duty hard
to defend. On the other hand, the pressure to generate additional tax revenue had eased.
Higher rates of economic growth after 2013 raised taxable incomes, while improved
management raised tax collection (Booth et al., 2014). This gave government greater room
for manoeuver. Two years later, the government relented and removed the excise duty.
The Alcoholic Drinks Control (Amendment) Act (May, 2015) replaced the excise duty of
50 percent for beer made from sorghum, millet and cassava, by a duty of just 10 percent, on
condition that this was packed in kegs rather than in bottles[18].
Thus, the end result was a face-saving compromise that allowed both sides to claim
victory. The excise duty on sorghum beer was reduced rather than eliminated, as EABL
wanted. Consequently, sorghum beer would continue to contribute to government revenue,
while the higher price of Senator keg would not deter consumers and allow sales to recover
quickly. In fact, revenue from sales by EABL in 2016 were close to the levels reached in
2012. When government next raised excise duty in the budget of 2015, the burden fell on
bottled beers and spirits rather than on Senator keg (EABL, 2016).
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Conspicuously absent from this story of adaptation are the consumers – the wananchi or
common man whose thirst had fueled the boom in sales of sorghum beer. They did not need
any organization to make their voice heard. Their adaptation was straightforward: they
simply walked away. There are plenty of other products to choose from. At the end of the
day, the actors on the supply side of the value chain, and the government, were at the mercy
of the consumer. Adaptation was their only option, because the market power of the bottom
of the pyramid was simply too big and too lucrative to ignore.
4. Discussion
Viewed from the perspective of complex adaptive systems, the story of sorghum beer in
Kenya raises some general issues about the performance of smallholder value chains. In this
section, we reflect on three of these issues, setting them within a wider context.
The first issue is the nature of endogenous shocks. Unlike in Southern Africa, where
government played a major role in opaque sorghum beer, brewing in Kenya was always a
private enterprise (Partanen, 1991). The creation of the value chain for sorghum beer was based
on a partnership between business and government. Indeed, the key partner was government.
Without its agreement to first reduce and then to eliminate excise duty in order to make
Senator keg competitive with chang’aa, sorghum beer was not commercially viable. The same
was true for sorghum beer in Uganda, where EABL’s competitor SABMiller had developed
Eagle Lager, launched in 2002. As in Kenya, success relied critically on government support:
Raw material inputs represent only about 15% of the retail selling price of beer and thus it is clear
that even a drastic reduction in the cost of raw materials will not have a significant impact on the
retail selling price if margins are to be maintained. The key success factor in a project of this nature,
then, is to obtain a reduction in excise duty applicable to a product made from predominantly local
raw materials and which could demonstrably contribute to economic development within the
country (Mackintosh and Higgins, 2004, p. 238).
The value chain’s dependence on what was effectively a state subsidy made it vulnerable to
policy change. First of all, government support was not binding: what was given could also
be taken away. EABL’s initial agreement was with the government of Mwai Kibaki (2002-
2007) but the government of Uhuru Kenyatta (2013-present) was not bound by this decision.
Second, excise duty on alcohol was traditionally an important source of tax revenue. Across
the region, this was set at high levels. This gave legitimacy to the government’s decision to
extend excise duty to sorghum beer. Third, policy is often a compromise between competing
objectives. In this case, the government had to reconcile at least four policy objectives:
finance ( fiscal stability), public health (the threat from chang’aa), economics (growth of the
value chain) and development (reducing poverty for smallholders). Priority-setting among
these objectives reflects the relative power of different Ministries and the pressure of events
on government. Fourth, there is the time-pressure on government to make quick decisions.
The election was held on March 4, 2013, the new National Treasury Cabinet Secretary was
appointed on 23rd April, and the budget speech that imposed excise duty was made on 13th
June. For a new government with a myriad issues to consider, a space of just eight weeks left
little time for consultation. Thus, the policy decision on excise duty came out of the blue.
Finally, there is the fog of ignorance in which government operates. The career civil
servants who made the decision to impose excise duty on sorghum beer were experienced
economists[19]. But because EABL refused to disclose its revenue from Senator keg
(Business Daily, 31 May, 2013), they had no idea how much the excise duty would reduce
sales. On the other hand, they already knew that the excise duty on bottled beers was too
high to maximize revenue (Karingi et al., 2001). Thus, the decision to impose a 50 percent
excise duty on sorghum beer was a leap in the dark. This uncertainty over the impact of
policy decisions created additional uncertainty in the value chain.
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A second general issue is the nature of adaptation in smallholder value chains.
Clearly, the capacity for adaptation varied greatly between different value chain actors.
Adaptation was relatively easy for EABL, a large, multinational company with income
spread across three countries in the region and KES11 billion in assets (EABL, 2014). At the
other extreme, the capacity for adaptation among 30,000 smallholders with few alternative
markets for sorghum was limited. In a democracy where parties are not based on class
interests but on ethnic rivalries, smallholders in Eastern Kenya were vulnerable to a change
in regime. Defeated in the 2013 election, their political patrons were powerless to protect
them. However, this asymmetry in adaptive capacity did not make smallholders passive
victims. Through the CGA they were able to mobilize enough political support to have the
decision overturned. The CGA is just one of a number of special-interest groups that have
mushroomed in Kenya in the 1990s following market liberalization. By changing the
institutional landscape, market liberalization has created a powerful counterweight to
government’s control over agricultural policy. However, if these interest groups are not
consulted when policy is formulated, their power becomes evident only after policy has been
made and its effects become clear. As a result, government policy tends to proceed by trial
and error. This helps explain the policy U-turns that characterize policy making for
smallholder agriculture in some developing countries (Harrigan, 2003). What appears as a
lack of consistency is actually part of the process by which agricultural policy is made.
A general point here is the political role that farmer organizations can play in smallholder
value chains. Typically, economists see this role in purely functional terms as providing
scattered and physically isolated smallholders with services and access to markets. But they
play multiple roles. Through its control of resources from donor projects, the GGA was a
patron in their own right. This reinforced its interest in protecting the value chain.
More generally, a political system that centers on ethnic rivalries creates the space for
farmer organizations to play the role of political parties that represent economic interests.
Obviously, such organizations represent smallholders with different levels of resources.
But they can be effective in uniting these smallholders to protect a common interest and, in
doing so, provide smallholders with a political voice. In protecting the value chain for
sorghum beer, this role was critical.
A third and final general issue is the wider problem of uncertainty in smallholder value
chains. Unlike risk, where the probability of a given outcome can be calculated,
uncertainty refers to situations where the probability of a given outcome is unknown.
In the case of sorghum beer, one major source of uncertainty is government policy.
This reflects something more fundamental, namely the conflict between development and
political objectives.
From the standpoint of development, the value chain for sorghum beer has great
potential. Multinational breweries are searching for new markets as beer consumption falls
in developed countries (Swinnen and Vandermoortele, 2011). Demand for beer in Africa is
growing thanks to a large and expanding middle class. If we define “aspirational”
consumers as those with an income of $2-$4 per day, the potential consumers of sorghum
beer in Kenya numbered nine million and accounted for 22 percent of the total population
(Lufumpa et al., 2015). This growing middle class will fuel consumer demand for processed
products. Unfortunately, we do not have projections for Kenya. But projections for three
countries in the same region (Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Mozambique) suggest that by 2040
middle-class households with incomes of $2-$4 per day will account for 21 percent of
consumer expenditure on food (Tschirley et al., 2015). Kenya is already the third biggest
market for beer in Africa (World Health Organization, 2011). Africans have long seen bottled
beer as a badge of modernity (Willis, 2002; Partanen, 1991). As incomes rise, the next few
decades will see growing numbers of middle-class consumers aspiring to buy products that
match their new status.
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Kenya’s brewing industry is well placed to meet this demand. EABL enjoys a virtual
monopoly of the beer market in Kenya, with a market share in 2011 of 83 percent[20]. EABL
can also tap the regional market through its subsidiaries in Tanzania, Uganda, and South
Sudan. The company has made strategic investments, selling off its minority share in
Tanzania Breweries Limited, buying a controlling stake in Serengeti Breweries in Tanzania
in 2010, and buying out SABMiller’s remaining stake in KBL[21], as well as building
capacity both in Kenya and across the region (EABL, 2011, 2012). Targeting consumers at
“the bottom of the pyramid,” in this case those living just above the poverty line, is viewed
as a winning business strategy (Prahalad and Hart, 2002). Competition is fierce, however,
and EABL’s Senator keg must compete with SABMiller’s Eagle Lager, a sorghum beer
popular in Tanzania and Zambia (Inspiris Limited, 2006). Investment in sorghum beer can
have powerful multiplier effects. An evaluation of the economic impact of Eagle Lager in
Uganda estimated benefits to the economy of USD 92 million (Kapstein et al., 2009). From a
development perspective, therefore, the development of the value chain for sorghum beer is
a win-win scenario: higher incomes for farmers, bigger sales for EABL, cheaper, safer beer
for ordinary Kenyans, and more tax revenue for government.
Will this development potential be realized? In a “developmental state” on the East Asian
model, the answer would be an unequivocal Yes. In Kenya, however, the answer is less
certain. This uncertainty surrounding the future trajectory of the value chain stems from the
nature of politics in Kenya. As political scientists have pointed out:
Five to six moderately large [ethnic] blocs make up a large share of the total. To construct a
winning coalition, it is only necessary to attract the leaders of two or three of those blocs.
This creates the virtual certainty that the outcome of an election will exclude at least one or two
substantial ethno-regional groups from participation in government. This raises the stakes to a
very high level […]. Presidents and governments cannot afford to govern in the national interest,
lest they undermine the sectional support on which their re-election depends (Booth and
Golooba-Mutebi, 2014, p. 18).
Thus, the source of uncertainty in the value chain for clear sorghum beer in Kenya lies in the
political structure. Resolving this uncertainty will require changing this structure through
the development of new institutions – a new “political settlement” – that will allow
government to follow national as opposed to sectional interests (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi,
2014). This does not mean that the value chain is doomed to fail. As we have seen, it has
proved extremely resilient. But it does suggest that (as in 1992 and 2013) its future trajectory
may be interrupted by sudden, endogenous shocks, disputes between interacting agents, and
adaptation as government coalitions change and as development objectives are sacrificed to
short-term political advantage. Our analogy with the fable of the goose that laid the golden
eggs is based on the premise that the government wished to optimize short-term revenue. But
if the objective is not economic but political – to inflict damage on political opponents – then
our analogy is based on a false premise. In a political system based on the principle of “it’s our
turn to eat,” the winner takes all – and the losers go hungry (Wrong, 2009).
5. Conclusion
The micro-history of a single policy decision can teach us useful lessons about smallholder
value chains. Sorghum beer is a case in point. We conclude by summarizing three lessons
that have emerged from our analysis.
The story of clear sorghum beer in Kenya shows the importance of contextual factors in
explaining the behavior of smallholder value chains. The importance of these factors is
easily overlooked by conventional value chain guides, which take the context as given.
In the case of sorghum beer, however, the context is central to the story. This value chain
reflects the close relationship between business and politics in Kenya. Sorghum beer was
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conceived not just as a commercial opportunity but as an instrument of social control.
Commercial success was conditional on political support. However, this made the value
chain vulnerable to changes in political regime. The success of sorghum beer in Kenya
rested on fragile foundations that could crumble overnight if the government changed its
mind. The general point here is that smallholder value chains where there are close links
between business and politics face a high risk of endogenous shocks. The brewing industry
is a prime example. Because of the importance of alcohol to government both for revenue
and for social control, the price of beer is a barometer for this relationship. This political
dimension creates an additional source of uncertainty in the value chain. Furthermore, the
political system in Kenya – a neo-patrimonial state based on ethnic rivalries – makes
the relationship between business and politics unstable. In particular, transitions from one
regime to another can be hazardous for any business that supports the wrong side.
The result is to create uncertainty in any value chain whose development relies on the
government’s continuous support.
Smallholder value chains can adapt to sudden, endogenous shocks, but this requires
organizational capacity and skills. In the case of sorghum beer, resistance to government
policy was led by a national farmer’s organization that had a vested interest in the value
chain and the ability to form and lead a coalition of stakeholders that succeeded in having
the change in policy reversed. Adaptation therefore requires that smallholders are
represented at the national level by organizations whose power is recognized. Without such
organizations to give them a political voice and mobilize support from other stakeholders,
smallholders have little chance of influencing policy. This reinforces the need to strengthen
capacity in farmer organizations to identify potential threats and develop adaptive
strategies, including the need for stronger communication with government on the impact of
specific policy choices on smallholders.
Framing the story in terms of complex systems helps capture the inner dynamics of
smallholder value chains. In particular, it focuses attention on the agendas of different
value chain actors, how far these agendas overlap, and potential sources of conflict
between them. Although the agendas of smallholders, EABL, and government were
initially in close agreement, they changed over time. The agenda for government shifted
from public health to revenue, which prompted the hike in excise duty. By contrast, the
agenda for EABL was the same throughout, namely to make a profit from consumers at
the bottom of the pyramid. When this strategy ran into difficulties EABL did not hesitate
to switch products from sorghum beer to cheap spirits. Only when the agendas of
government and EABL coincide will smallholders in Kenya continue to benefit from the
value chain for sorghum beer.
Notes
1. The decision to declare home-brewed beer illegal was not motivated by the desire to increase
government revenue, but simply by President Moi’s personal aversion to alcohol (Haugerud,
1995, p. 86).
2. Unlike in South Africa, Rhodesia and Botswana (Rogerson and Tucker, 1985; Haggblade, 1992)
the commercial brewing of opaque sorghum beer (chibuku) was never industrialized in Kenya.
3. Hustlers now mourn tax hike on Senator Keg in the 2013/2014 Kenya Budget, Standard Digital,
June 15, 2013.
4. “EABL stops daily brewing as growth hits a four-year low,” Business Daily, March 13, 2014.
5. “Kenya: return of SABMiller Stirs New Beer Wars” March 28, 2011, available at http://allafrica.
com/stories/201103290088.html
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6. Poisoning from chang’aa resulted from adulteration with jet fuel, methanol, battery acid, and
embalming fluid. Less lethal ingredients reportedly included decomposing rats and women’s
underpants. “Kill me quick: Kenya’s lethal brew deserves its name.” The Economist, April 29,
2010. For the early history of chang’aa, see de Smedt (2009).
7. Once more illustrating the close ties between government and business, the parliamentary motion
to ban “power drinks” was brought by John Michuki, an MP who had held a beer distributorship
for Kenya Breweries Limited since the 1960s (Willis, 2003, p. 251).
8. EABL sees sales drop after new tax measures on Senator Keg, Business Daily, January 23, 2014.
9. The first commercial producer of sorghum clear beer was Nigerian Breweries Limited, a member
of the Heineken group, which started production in 1988 following the decision by the
Government of Nigeria to ban the import of barley malt.
10. Senator became known as “Obama” beer since the launch in 2004 coincided with Barack Obama’s
election as Senator for Illinois in January 2005. His father, Barack Obama Sr, was born in Siaya
district, Kenya, and a Luo, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7251273.stm
11. Packaging costs account for up to 60 percent of beer production costs.
12. “EABL sees sales drop after new tax measures on Senator Keg,” Business Daily, January 23, 2014.
13. Budget Speech June 13, 2013, paragraph 78, available at: http://www.citizennews.co.ke/news/20
12/local/item/11232-budget-2013-2014-speech-by-henry-rotich
14. EABL claimed that by 2008 Senator Keg had “wrested 44% of the informal alcohol market”
(EABL, 2013).
15. “EABL targets Senator Market with Sh10 spirit”, Business Daily, November 5, 2014.
16. “Grain value chain/Kenya – a collective win for sorghum value chain actors”, August 5, 2015,
available at: http://agritrade.cta.int/en/Agriculture/Commodities/Cereals/Grain-value-chain-
Kenya-A-collective-win-for-sorghum-value-chain-actors
17. A former President of AGRA, Jane Karuku, had joined the EABL Board of Directors in September
2013 and subsequently became Managing Director of KBL in 2015 (EABL, 2014, annual report).
18. “Uhuru signs into law Bills on beer, domestic violence, public service”, Business Daily,
May 15, 2015.
19. Henry Rotich, the National Treasury Cabinet Secretary, who presented the budget, had been Head
of Macroeconomics at the Treasury, since 2006; Joseph Kinyua, the Permanent Secretary to the
Treasury, Ministry of Finance, and Mutua Kilaka, Financial Secretary at the Ministry of Finance.
All three were trained economists. Details available at: http://treasury.go.ke/index.php/aboutus/
senior-management/
20. “Kenya is Africa’s third Largest Beer Market”, available at: https://abacus.co.ke/kenya-is-africas-
third-largest-beer-market/
21. “Diageo buys out Kenya Breweries” Brewers Guardian.com, June 7, 2011, available at: www.
brewersguardian.com/brewing-features/international/995.html
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